A Ternary Fuzzy Extractor For Efficient Cryptographic Key Generation

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A Ternary Fuzzy Extractor For Efficient Cryptographic Key Generation 10

A Ternary Fuzzy Extractor For Efficient Cryptographic Key Generation Download

Fuzzy extractor structure using serially concatenated BCH-Polar codes is proposed to generate reproducible keys from a ReRAM-based ternary-state Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for device authentication and secret key generation. The main concern in deploying PUF-based key generation methods is the leakage of information about. Fuzzy extractors are a method that allows biometric data to be used as inputs to standard cryptographic techniques for security. 'Fuzzy', in this context, refers to the fact that the fixed values required for cryptography will be extracted from values close to but not identical to the original key, without compromising the security required. Starcraft 2 game key generator. One application is to encrypt and authenticate users records. Abstract—The procedure for extracting a cryptographic key from noisy sources, such as biometrics and Physically Un- cloneable Functions (PUFs), is known as Fuzzy Extractor (FE). Although FE constructions deal with discrete sources, most noisy sources are continuous.